Channel Selection and Coordination in Dual-Channel Supply Chains

This paper investigates the influence of channel structures and channel coordination on the supplier, the retailer, and the entire supply chain in the context of two single-channel and two dual-channel supply chains. We extensively study two Pareto zone concepts: channel-adding Pareto zone and contract-implementing Pareto zone. In the channel-adding Pareto zone, both the supplier and the retailer benefit from adding a new channel to the traditional single-channel supply chain. In the contract-implementing Pareto zone, it is mutually beneficial for the supplier and the retailer to utilize the proposed contract coordination policy. The analysis suggests the preference lists of the supplier and the retailer over channel structures with and without coordination are different, and depend on parameters like channel base demand, channel operational costs, and channel substitutability

Joint logistics and financial services by a 3PL firm

Integrated logistics and financial services have been practiced by third party logistics (3PL) firms for years; however, the literature has been silent on the value of 3PL firms as credit providers in budget-constrained supply chains. This paper investigates an extended supply chain model with a supplier, a budget-constrained retailer, a bank, and a 3PL firm, in which the retailer has insufficient initial budget and may borrow or obtain trade credit from either a bank (traditional role) or a 3PL firm (control role). Our analysis indicates that the control role model yields higher profits not only for the 3PL firm but also for the supplier, the retailer, and the entire supply chain. In comparison with a supplier credit model where the supplier provides the trade credit, the control role model yields a better performance for the supply chain as long as the 3PL firm’s marginal profit is greater than that of the supplier. We further demonstrate that, for all players, both the control role and supplier credit models can outperform the classic newsvendor model without budget constraint

Equilibrium Financing in a Distribution Channel with Capital Constraint

There exist capital constraints in many distribution channels. We examine a channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the retailer is capital constrained. The retailer may fund its business by borrowing credit either from a competitive bank market or from the manufacturer, provided the latter is willing to lend. When only one credit type (either bank or trade credit) is viable, we show that trade credit financing generally charges a higher wholesale price and thus becomes less attractive than bank credit financing for the retailer. When both bank and trade credits are viable, the unique equilibrium is trade credit financing if production cost is relatively low but is bank credit financing otherwise. We also study the case where both the retailer and the manufacturer are capital constrained and demonstrate that, to improve the overall supply chain efficiency, the bank should finance the manufacturer if production cost is low but finance the retailer otherwise. Our analysis further suggests that the equilibrium region of trade credit financing shrinks as demand variability or the retailer\u27s internal capital level increases

Monte Carlo approximation in incomplete information, sequential auction games

We model sequential, possibly multiunit, sealed bid auctions as a sequential game with imperfect and incomplete information. We develop an agent that constructs a bidding policy by sampling the valuation space of its opponents, solving the resulting complete information game, and aggregating the samples into a policy. The constructed policy takes advantage of information learned in the early stages of the game and is flexible with respect to assumptions about the other bidders\u27 valuations. Because the straightforward expansion of the complete information game is intractable, we develop a more concise representation that takes advantage of the sequential auctions\u27 natural structure. We examine the performance of our agent versus agents that play perfectly, agents that also create policies using Monte Carlo, and other benchmarks. The technique performs quite well in these empirical studies, although the tractability of the problem is bounded by the ability to solve component games

The Role of Expectation–Reality Discrepancy in Service Contracts

Service contracts are common practice in some industries while being eliminated in others. To investigate this phenomenon, we identify expectation–reality discrepancy (ERD) as a key determinant. A provider\u27s ERD is defined as consumers’ ex-ante expected valuation minus their ex-post realized valuation of the provider\u27s service. Our analysis reveals that providers’ contract strategies critically depend on their ERDs rather than the true service valuations. A provider with a higher ERD is more likely to enforce contracts, regardless of whether the true service valuation is higher than that of the competitor. Providers should enforce contracts only when they have positive ERDs. Furthermore, contracts have a competition-intensifying effect: when providers enforce contracts, their competition on promoting consumer expectations through marketing efforts is intensified, leading to higher ERDs with contracts than without contracts. Finally, consumers and society as a whole may benefit from higher switching costs because positive ERDs may mislead consumers to make wrong switching decisions and switching costs can help deter such switching behaviors

Buyer Financing in Pull Supply Chains: Zero-Interest Early Payment or In-House Factoring?

This study investigates the efficacy of zero-interest early payment financing (alternatively referred to as early payment) and positive-interest in-house factoring financing in a pull supply chain with a capital-constrained manufacturer selling a product through a capital-abundant retailer. Early payment is the prepayment of a wholesale cost to the manufacturer, whereas in-house factoring is a loan service provided to the manufacturer by a branch financing firm of the same retailer. We find that the retailer prefers early payment financing to bank financing when the manufacturer’s production cost is low. If the retailer instead offers positive-interest in-house factoring financing to the manufacturer, then the financing equilibrium domain enlarges as compared to bank financing. Interestingly, early payment financing can outplay positive-interest in-house factoring financing if the production cost is considerably low; otherwise, vice versa. When the production cost is big enough, the retailer will not provide either early payment or in-house factoring. Furthermore, our main qualitative result sustains with an identical wholesale price across all three financing schemes and the financing equilibrium domain of early payment shrinks as demand variability grows

Optimal Reserve Prices in Name-Your-Own-Price Auctions with Bidding and Channel Options

Few papers have explored the optimal reserve prices in the name-your-own-price (NYOP) channel with bidding options in a multiple channel environment. In this paper, we investigate a double-bid business model in which the consumers can bid twice in the NYOP channel, and compare it with the single-bid case. We also study the impact of adding a retailer-own list-price channel on the optimal reserve prices. This paper focuses on achieving some basic understanding on the potential gain of adding a second bid option to a single-bid system and on the potential benefits of adding a list-price channel by the NYOP retailer. We show that a double-bid scenario can outperform a single-bid scenario in both single-channel and dual-channel situations. The optimal reserve price in the double-bid scenario is no less than that in the single-bid case. Furthermore, the addition of a retailer-own list-price channel could push up the reserve prices in both single-bid and double-bid scenarios

Financing Multiple Heterogeneous Suppliers in Assembly Systems: Buyer Finance vs. Finance

Buyer finance has been practiced by manufacturers/assemblers for years; however, few papers have investigated the efficacy of buyer finance in an assembly system with multiple suppliers. This paper fills the literature gap by comparing buyer finance with bank finance in a supply chain with one assembler and multiple heterogeneous capital-constrained component suppliers. We characterize the equilibrium solutions for different financing schemes (i.e., buyer finance, bank finance, and no finance). We show that in buyer finance the assembler should charge the suppliers the lowest possible interest rate, which may be even below its own unit capital opportunity cost, leading to interest losses in financing suppliers. However, the assembler can benefit more from enhanced inventory backup and lower component purchasing prices resulting from the low buyer-finance interest rate. We further compare the two financing schemes from the perspectives of the assembler, the borrowing and nonborrowing suppliers, and the whole supply chain. Our analysis reveals that the assembler may offer buyer finance even if its own unit capital opportunity cost is higher than the bank risk-free interest rate. We also demonstrate how the suppliers’ initial capitals, production costs, and their heterogeneities affect the assembler’s selection of the optimal financing scheme and identify the conditions under which buyer finance is better than bank finance for different parties in this assembly supply chain

Exclusive Channels and Revenue Sharing in a Complementary Goods Market

This paper evaluates the joint impact of exclusive channels and revenue sharing on suppliers and retailers in a hybrid duopoly common retailer and exclusive channel model. The model bridges the gap in the literature on hybrid multichannel supply chains with bilateral complementary products and services with or without revenue sharing. The analysis indicates that, without revenue sharing, the suppliers are reluctant to form exclusive deals with the retailers; thus, no equilibrium results. With revenue sharing from the retailers to the suppliers, it can be an equilibrium strategy for the suppliers and retailers to form exclusive deals. Bargaining solutions are provided to determine the revenue sharing rates. Our additional results suggest forming exclusive deals becomes less desirable for the suppliers if revenue sharing is also in place under nonexclusivity. In our extended discussion, we also study the impact of channel asymmetry, an alternative model with fencing, composite package competition, and enhanced price-dependent revenue sharing

Optimal Reserve Prices in Name-Your-Own-Price Auctions with Bidding and Channel Options

Few papers have explored the optimal reserve prices in the name-your-own-price (NYOP) channel with bidding options in a multiple channel environment. In this paper, we investigate a double-bid business model in which the consumers can bid twice in the NYOP channel, and compare it with the single-bid case. We also study the impact of adding a retailer-own list-price channel on the optimal reserve prices. This paper focuses on achieving some basic understanding on the potential gain of adding a second bid option to a single-bid system and on the potential benefits of adding a list-price channel by the NYOP retailer. We show that a double-bid scenario can outperform a single-bid scenario in both single-channel and dual-channel situations. The optimal reserve price in the double-bid scenario is no less than that in the single-bid case. Furthermore, the addition of a retailer-own list-price channel could push up the reserve prices in both single-bid and double-bid scenarios.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/78715/1/j.1937-5956.2009.01045.x.pd